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NOTES
THRESHOLD DETERMINATIONS UNDER SECTION
102(2)(C) OF NEPA: THE CASE FOR "REASONABLENESS"
AS A STANDARD FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
The perception of beauty is a moral test.'
-H. Thoreau
Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA)2 in response to growing national awareness of environmen-
tal degradation and the manifest threat of a technologically oriented
society3 to public health and the preservation of natural resources.'
Culminating a decade of congressional attempts to protect the envi-
ronment,5 that landmark legislation signaled the nation's formal
commitment to "a national policy which will encourage productive
and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment [and]
to ... efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the envi-
ronment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of
man .... ,,6 To implement the substantive provision, section 1017
1. H. Thoreau, Tn BLuE Bm CARRMS THE SKY ON His BACK 3 (1970).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970)[hereinafter cited as NEPAl.
3. The fate of the Cossatot River in Arkansas, one of the last free-flowing streams in that
region, presents a disturbing case in point. Presented with a challenge to the Army Corps of
Engineers Gilham Dam proposal, the district court recognized that mission-oriented agencies
may have a blindered aesthetic view: "To dam builders the structure of the embankment and
its mechanical and engineering accoutrements must be the ultimate in beauty." Environmen-
tal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 342 F. Supp. 1211, 1223 (E.D. Ark. 1972). See note
80 infra.
4. See Hearings on S. 1075, S. 237 & S. 1752 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
5. See, e.g., Resources and Conservation Act of 1960, S. 2549, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959);
The Ecological Research and Surveys Bill, S. 2282, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965); S. 2805, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
6. NEPA § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
7. NEPA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970). Congress set forth its declaration of national
environmental policy in subsection (a) and, in subsection (b), reaffirmed the continuing
responsibility of the federal government to work toward several goals:
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environ-
ment for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and
culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended conse-
quenices;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national
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of Title I of the Act, the procedural mandates in section 102 direct
agencies to consider environmental values in their decisionmaking
"to the fullest extent possible."" The crucial procedural requirement
in section 102 is the "action-forcing" provision' of subsection(2)(C)
that requires an agency to "include in every recommendation or
report on proposals for legislation and other major federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a de-
tailed statement . . .,,
Despite the statute's enunciation of a national environmental pol-
icy, the importance which judicial and administrative bodies attach
to the goals declared in section 101 remains unclear. Courts have
been reluctant to review an agency's action substantively, once an
agency issues an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to comply
with the section 102 procedural requirement." Commentators have
heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports di-
versity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit
high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum
attainable recycling of depletable resources.
NEPA § 102(b), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970).
8. NEPA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). The procedural requirements of section 102
mandate that agencies:
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach. . . in decisionmaking
which may have an impact on man's environment;
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures. . . which will insure that
presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given ap-
propriate consideration...
(D) study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended
courses of action in any proposal ....
Id. § 102(2), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1970).
9. Hearings on S.1075, 8.237 & S.1752 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 116 (1969). Having thus characterized the provision in commit-
tee, Senator Jackson, the sponsor of NEPA, reemphasized his point on the floor of the Senate:
"To insure that the policies and goals defined in this act are infused into the ongoing pro.
grams and actions of the Federal Government, the act also establishes some important
'action-forcing' procedures." 115 CONG. REc. 40416 (1969). See also S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
10. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970) (emphasis supplied).
11. Upon finding procedural compliance, the majority of judicial decisions have accorded
no substantive review to impact statements. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Har-
din, 325 F. Supp. 1401, 1404 (D.D.C. 1971). But see Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972). In the latter case the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit rejected the district court's characterization of NEPA as creating no substan-
tive rights. Although affirming the lower court's decision, the appellate tribunal regarded the
Act as more than a mere full-disclosure law. Id. at 297.
Commentators have been more willing to require substantive review of an EIS. See
generally, 51 N.C.L. Ray. 145 (1972); 51 ORE. L. Rav. 408 (1972) (arguing that statutory
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noted the courts' even greater reluctance to accord those environ-
mental goals the status of legal or constitutional imperatives.' 2 Al-
though plaintiffs routinely plead the fifth, ninth, and fourteenth
amendments in environmental claims, no court recognizes the exist-
ence of a constitutional or legal right under section 101(B) in third
parties not directly involved in a project affecting the environ-
ment.13 Furthermore, the legislative history of the Act militates
against judicial recognition of such a right: the Senate specifically
articulated "a fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful en-
vironment," 4 but the conference committee struck this terminology
and inserted the less forceful language of section 101(C).15
Given the compromised effectiveness of the substantive section
101, pursuit of environmental remedies under the Act must lie in
judicial review of agency compliance with the procedural require-
ments in section 102. Without that review, agencies can erode even
the minimal statutory purpose of mere disclosure; the agency can
conclude that it need not draft an impact statement because the
project does not entail major federal actions significantly affecting
the environment. Ample evidence exists that agencies now consider
a "negative determination" a potent weapon 6 against environmen-
construction supports substantive review); 20 U. KAN. L. REv. 501 (1972). See also note 109
infra & accompanying text.
12. See Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment; E=MC2: Environment Equals Man
Times Courts Redoubling Their Efforts, 55 CORNEL.L L. REv. 674, 691 (1970); Note, Toward a
Constitutionally Protected Environment, 56 VA. L. REV. 458 (1970).
13. See, e.g., Hagedorn v. Union Carbide Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1061, 1064-65 (N.D.W. Va.
1973) (action under Clean Air Act and Civil Rights Act of 1971 rather than NEPA); Tanner
v. ARMCO Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728, 738-39 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
Professor Reitze advances the constitutional contentions which environmentalists seek. A.
RErTZE, JR., 1 ENvmomtENTAL LAw, One-12 through One-17 (2d ad. 1972). The author suggests
that courts may accord environmental plaintiffs constitutional status in a manner similar to
the assertion of the penumbras of specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights to sustain the
doctrine of marital privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Reitze's view,
Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold, stressing the applicability of the ninth
amendment, also would support environmental claims.
14. S.1075, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(b) (1969).
15. "TIThe compromise language was adopted because of doubt on the part of the House
conferees with respect to the legal scope of the original Senate provisions." 2 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 2768-69 (1969).
16. An extreme example of the potency of a negative determination is the Hanly series of
decisions which resulted in more than two years of litigation and three separate hearings in
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit before achieving judicial approval of an agency
determination that no EIS need be filed. See notes 34-41 infra & accompanying text. The
latest, and apparently final, chapter in the Hanly saga is Hanly v. Kleindienst, 484 F.2d 448
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1934 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hanly IM1.
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talists, whereas to avoid judicial review they previously asserted
the threshold defenses of standing, 7 jurisdiction,'8 sovereign im-
munity,'9 and absence of statutory authority." Some federal actions
are obviously major 2' and significant; others, so inconsequential
17. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), is the landmark environmental case on
standing, requiring a showing by a plaintiff that he is in fact injured by the defendant's
action. The explicit ground for the Court's denial of standing led to subsequent acceptance
of an amended complaint by the district court, Sierra Club v. Morton, 348 F. Supp. 219 (N.D.
Cal. 1972). See 57 SmRRA CLUB BULLrN, June, 1972, at 17, for the details of plaintiff's
amended complaint. Efforts by plaintiffs to fulfill the Sierra Club requirement in later envi-
ronmental cases apparently will fare well against challenges to standing. See, e.g., Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedure (SCRAP) v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189
(D.D.C. 1972), reu'd on other grounds, 93 S. Ct. 2405 (1973) (upholding standing in a theory
of action based on use of the resources, relying partly upon the assertion in the Sierra Club
amended complaint).
18. Virtually no agency has argued successfully that the courts lack jurisdiction to hear
environmental claims. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. TVA, 340 F. Supp. 400
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (rejecting defendant's claim that the court had no jurisdiction under NEPA).
Early administrative unresponsiveness to NEPA provisions was occasionally so flagrant as
to constitute a challenge to the authority of the judiciary to enforce the statute. See, e.g.,
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The court's
criticism of agency noncompliance there, coupled with Judge Wright's strong indictment df
AEC rulemaking, apparently precludes future implied jurisdictional attacks. Recent case law
indicates, however, that individual plaintiffs in a class action must demonstrate infringement
of an economic or property interest in a sufficient amount to satisfy the requirements for
federal court jurisdiction. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). See
generally, A. REIrrZE, supra note 13, at One-19 to One-20 (discussing problems attending
jurisdictional amounts under NEPA).
19. The Supreme Court has emasculated the once potent doctrine of sovereign immunity
which agencies employed as a threshold defense. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)
(permitting courts to deny judicial review of administrative action only where clear and
convincing evidence demonstrates such a legislative intent). Defendants argued sovereign
immunity in early NEPA cases, butAbbott renders such tactics futile. See, e.g., Izaak Walton
League of American v. Macchia, 2 BNA Erv. REP. CASEs 1661 (D.N.J. 1971); Izaak Walton
League of America v. St. Clair, 313 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Minn. 1970) (both holding that the
suit was not barred).
20. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 941 (1966). The environmental challenge in Scenic Hudson, not arising under NEPA,
avoided the lack of statutory authority as a defense through imaginative pleadings and the
fortuitous language of section 10(a) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1970).
21. An agency determines initially whether an action is "major," but later measurements
of time, planning, resources, or fiscal expenditures render this decision susceptible to objec-
tive verification. The "major action" requirement has generated little controversy because
many agencies, recognizing a notable monetary commitment, concede that a major action
exists and argue instead that the proposed projects involve no significant environmental
effect. See, e.g., Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971).
In Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 465 n.3 (5th Cir. 1973), the agency did not
concede that the project was "major," but nonetheless relied on its determination that no
significant environmental effect would result. But see Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th
Cir. 1972) (grant of a 99-year lease on Indian lands contested, but held "major," requiring
an EIS). See generally Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) Guidelines 5(a)(ii), 36 Fed.
Reg. 7724 (1971).
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either in scope or in cumulative effects that they require no
EIS.22 The vast majority of actions, however, fall into a middle
ground requiring construction of the general statutory guidelines,s
thus inexorably leading to litigation. 24
Building upon judicial and administrative response to NEPA,
this Note will examine judicial review of administrative compliance
with the procedural requirements in section 102. As crucial as the
word "significantly" is to constraining administrative discretion in
the statutory scheme, existing legislative and judicial guidance sug-
gests the abandonment of attempts to develop an apocalyptic defi-
nition of that term in favor of agreement upon an appropriate stan-
dard of case-by-case judicial review. An analysis of conflicting case
law in conjunction with the broad purposes of NEPA will demon-
strate a trend toward intensifying evaluation of procedural compli-
ance, indicating that "reasonableness" is the most advantageous
standard for judicial review.
TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF "SIGNIFICANTLY"
Despite the importance of the word "significantly" to NEPA pro-
cedures, resort to the statutory context of the term and to its inter-
pretation by the agency charged with application of the Act leaves
the definition obscured. The legislative history of NEPA is virtually
useless in determining the meaning of the term.2 Although "the
infirmity of the phrase,"2 has been noted judicially, Congress ap-
parently has left the initial interpretation to the Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality (CEQ) and, in turn, to the agencies themselves.
22. See, e.g., Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783 (D. Me. 1972) (envi-
ronmental damage caused by mock amphibious landings on beaches of state park determined
insignificant by the Navy; court concurred).
23. See, e.g., Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972).
The court of appeals characterized NEPA as "a statute whose meaning is more uncertain
than most, not merely because it is relatively new, but also because of the generality of its
phrasing." 460 F.2d at 642.
24. Asserting that ". . .NEPA is fashioned in a manner calculated to breed litigation," one
commentator accordingly has sought to channel the enormous burden of environmental cases
into an environmental court system, thereby combining the virtues of administrative exper-
tise and judicial impartiality. Whitney, The Case for Creating a Special Environmental Court
System, 14 WM. & MARY L. Ray. 473, 489 (1973). See also Whitney, The Case for Creating a
Special Environmental Court System-A Further Comment, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 33
(1973).
25. The legislative history of section 102(2)(C) does not mention the phrase "significantly
affecting the... environment" in its amplifying remarks. See 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 2769 (1969).
26. Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877, 880 (D. Ore. 1971).
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The original CEQ guidelines provided that in construing the phrase
"major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment," agencies were to consider the overall, cumu-
lative effect of the proposed action; an agency was to prepare an EIS
where the environmental impact was potential, controversial, or
reasonably anticipated in light of cumulative actions. 7 The latest
CEQ guidelines28 provide little further clarification, as they merely
codify the obvious implications of the statutory phrase: the federal
action must affect the human environment significantly either di-
rectly, or indirectly through adverse effects on the environment.2
These guidelines also recognize delegating to the agencies the initial
identification of significant actions .3  They interpret the terms
"major" and "significantly" as implying "thresholds of importance
and impact" to be met before a statement is required.3 1 Each agency
is urged to note its typical actions and to develop specific criteria
indicating the need for an environmental statement in any given
instance. 32 Guidelines, however helpful in assessing legislative pur-
pose, are merely suggestive and lack the force of law.3 3 Conse-
quently, while acknowledging the propriety of initial deference to
administrative discretion, the quest for clarification requires exam-
ining judicial interpretation of the term "significantly."
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made the first serious
attempt to define "significantly" in Hanly v. Kleindienst (Hanly
11).11 Judge Mansfield, writing for the majority, reasoned that the
27. 36 Fed. Reg. 7724-25 (1971).
28. 38 Fed. Reg. 20550 (1973).
29. Id. at 20552.
30. Id. at 20551.
31. Id. at 20552.
32. Id. That process normally will involve initially assessing the environmental impact
associated with an agency's various actions, identifying those actions that need an EIS, and
publishing criteria for such threshold decisions.
33. See, e.g., Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 421 (2d Cir. 1972);
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) v. United States, 346 F. Supp.
189, 200 n.14 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 93 S. Ct. 2405 (1973).
34. 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Hanley II]. The protracted litigation centered primarily on the refusal of the Governmental
Services Agency (GSA) to draft an EIS for a proposed courthouse annex in midtown Manhat-
tan. The dispute first came before the court of appeals in Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hanly 1]. The court held in
Hanly I that a terse GSA memorandum that no significant environmental effect would occur
was sufficient as to the office building, but was insufficient with regard to the planned
Metropolitan Correction Center (MCC). Following the latter ruling, the GSA submitted a 25-
page "Assessment of the Environmental Impact" that still sought to avoid the detail of the




meaning of the term was a question of law and proceeded to examine
de novo an administrative determination of no significant environ-
mental effect." The court ruled that the agency was required to
consider two factors in its threshold determination regarding envi-
ronmental impact: "(1) the extent to which the action will cause
adverse environmental effects in excess of those created by existing
uses in the area affected by it, and (2). the absolute quantitative
adverse environmental effects of the action itself, including the
cumulative harm that results from its contribution to existing ad-
verse conditions or uses in the affected area."36 The panel then
remanded the case to the agency for further factfinding on matters
inadequately discussed in the agency's environmental assessment.37
Though agreeing that the meaning of "significantly" could be a
question of law, Chief Judge Friendly dissented from the court's
restrictive definition of the term. He suggested that section 102
required an EIS "'whenever the action arguably [would] have an
adverse environmental impact,' "38 and that "['significant'] covers
a spectrum ranging from 'not trivial' through 'appreciable' to 'im-
portant' and even 'momentous.' ",' Notwithstanding the semantic
differences between the majority and the dissent, Hanly I repre-
sents the most ambitious judicial attempt to provide objective cri-
teria for courts and agencies. 0 Neither the majority's test nor
Friendly's thoughtful dissent, however, clarifies the latest CEQ
guidelines, nor does an administrative threshold determination in
practice become less subjective.4 Consequently, Hanly 11 is more
35. 471 F.2d at 828, citing APA § 10(e),.5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
36. 471 F.2d at 830-31.
37. One matter which the court held GSA should have considered was the possibility that
the proposed MCC, if used for a drug maintenance program, would increase crime in the area
by exposing the neighborhood to drug pushers and "hangers-on." Id. at 834.
38. Id. at 838, quoting Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) v.
United States, 346 F. Supp. 189, 201 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 93 S. Ct. 2405
(1973).
39. 471 F.2d at 837. Judge Friendly contended that the scheme of NEPA would place the
meaning of "significant" at the lower end of the definitional spectrum. Id..
40. Hanly II generated considerable debate about the propriety of judicial review of admin-
istrative threshold determinations. See generally Note, NEPA, Environmental Impact State-
ments and the Hanly Litigation: To File or Not to File, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 522 (1973); Com-
ment, Judicial Review of a NEPA Negative Statement, 53 B.U.L. REv. 879 (1973); 51 TEx.
L. REv. 1016 (1973) (argument for requiring "mini" impact statements).
41. The court of appeals ultimately upheld the initial GSA assessment of no significant
environmental impact, despite plaintiff's claim that the determination was essentially a
recycled version of its predecessors. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 484 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973) (Hanly
Ill).
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notable for its acute articulation of the problem than for any precise
definition of "significantly."
CURRENT STANDARDS FOR REvIEw OF THRESHOLD DECISIONS
Other courts, seeking to clarify the statutory term, have contrib-
uted only modest improvements that primarily-serve to underscore
the absence of definitional unanimity. 2 Those opinions are notewor-
thy nonetheless because they present a controversy far more basic
than the meaning of "significantly." When an agency makes a nega-
tive determination under 102(2)(C), courts must decide first the
proper standard for judicial review of that decision. Selection of the
appropriate standard for judicial review necessitates two interre-
lated examinations: identification of the kind of question Piresented
by threshold determinations and analysis of the disparate standards
developed in recent cases.
"Action Significantly Affecting the . ..Environment" -
A Question of Law or Fact?
Although the language in NEPA has been characterized as
"opaque"4 3 and "woefully ambiguous,"" the initial task of the judi-
ciary should not be to define "significantly," but rather to charac-
terize the definitional problem as embodying a question of either
fact or law.45 Judicial concurrence in the CEQ directive that signifi-
cance of an effect should be determined initially on the basis of
agency expertise supports the contention that the term partially
embodies a question of fact.46 An equally meritorious contention is
42. See, e.g., Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) v. United
States, 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 93 S. Ct. 2405 (1973) (looking
to the CEQ guidelines for support); Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 886, 888 (W.D. Wis. 1971)
(court required to construe the statutory standards, then apply them to the planned project).
43. City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), quoted in
Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 825 (2d Cir. 1972) (Hanly I1).
44. Voight, The National Environment Policy Act and the Independent Regulatory
Agency, 5 NATURAL RasoucEs LAW. 13 (1972), quoted in Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823,
825 (2d Cir. 1972) (Hanly II).
45. The "Categorization Approach" is set forth in Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmen-
tal Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 CoLum. L. REv. 612 (1970). The
concept of categorization, derived from Judge Friendly's analysis in NLRB v. Marcus Truck-
ing Co., 286 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1961), is merely an attempt to label a particular conclusion as
resolving a question of fact, a question of law, or a mixed question. For a thorough description
of the definitional terms employed in this scheme, see Sive, supra at 620-24.
46. "Certainly, an administrative agency [such] as the Soil Conservation Service may
make a decision that a particular project is not major, or that it does not significantly affect
the quality of the human environment, and, that, therefore, the agency is not required to file
[Vol. 16:107
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that courts must ultimately scrutinize a threshold determination as
a matter of law" because of both the breadth of the statutory lan-
guage and the absence of instructive legislative history. Moreover,
the often interrelated functions of judicial and administrative tri-
bunals support the observation that the term may imply a "mixed
question of law and fact."' 8 Proper characterization of the defini-
tional question consequently becomes dependent upon the judicial
process for distinguishing questions of fact and law.
Two prominent administrative law scholars have proposed dis-
tinct theories to resolve the law-fact dilemma, described by Justice
Brandeis as one of the "demands" of the "supremacy of law."4
Professor Jaffe's analytical approach stresses the layman's under-
standing of the terms "fact '5 and "law."5 1 In using the analytical
approach, Jaffee has argued that courts seek to define the nature of
a given question by looking to the statutory authority of the
agency.5 2 Professor Davis, on the other hand, has asserted that the
Supreme Court characteristically rejects the analytical approach in
favor of the practical approach 3 whereby the Court "use[s] the
designation 'question of fact' for an administrative determination
on which it thinks substitution of judicial judgment undesirable
. . "54 Although debate over the correctness of the analytical or
an impact statement." Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356,
366 (E.D.N.C. 1972). Even the court of appeals in Hanly H, holding that the meaning of
"significantly" was a question of law, remanded to the GSA for further factual findings on
the effects of the proposed correctional center. 471 F.2d at 836.
47. The district court in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp.
356, 366 (E.D.N.C. 1972), concluded: "However, when the failure to file an impact statement
is challenged, it is the court that must construe the statutory standards of. .. 'significantly
affecting. .. ,' and having construed them, then apply them to the particular project, and
decide whether the agency's failure violates the Congressional command."
48. K. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TEXT § 30.01, at 545 (3d ed. 1972).
49. St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (concurring opinion).
See Sive, supra note 45, at 620, wherein the author describes the issue as "one of the most
difficult of all legal problems, involving distinctions as subtle and esoteric as any required of
judges, lawyers and legal scholars."
50. "A finding of fact is the assertion that a phenomenon has happened or is or will be
happening independent of or anterior to any assertion as to its legal effect." L. JAMra, JuDIcIAL
CONTROL OF ADmIsTRATrmV ACTiON, 548 (1965) (emphasis omitted).
51. Professor Jaffe advances a less rigorous definition of "law" although following Holmes!
belief that "the application of a rule to a particular case is not fact finding but law making
. ... "Id. at 554.
52. That tenet is also known as the "Clear Purpose Doctrine." Id. at 569-73. The NEPA
mandate, as refined in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C.
Cir. 1971),-that all agencies consider environmental effects in their decisionmaking, reflects
statutory administrative authority under the Clear Purpose Doctrine.
53. DAvis, supra note 48, § 30.01, at 546.
54. Id. § 30.03, at 549.
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practical approaches proceeds with some invective, 5 neither thesis
satisfactorily explains why courts react to an agency decision as a
question of law or of fact. Perhaps, therefore, the controversy per-
sists not because the wrong theories are advanced, but because the
wrong questions are posed. Considering the capriciousness of the
law-fact dilemma," a more advantageous approach would avoid the
terminology entirely.
The Supreme Court arguably has formulated an alternative ap-
proach to the law-fact rhetoric, -which both scholars implicitly rec-
ognize as valid. Professor Jaffe has contended that "judicial defer-
ence is as relevant to procedural as to substantive decisions"57 and,
discussing administrative expertise, he concluded: "[I]n the ab-
sence of a clear legal prescription a reasonable procedural decision
should withstand judicial interference . . . ."5 Noting that the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA) excepts from review action "com-
mitted to agency discretion," he maintained: "A court, therefore,
must decide as a 'question of law' whether there is 'discretion'...
and once the discretion is established, its exercise if 'reasonable' is
free of control."5 9 Although rejecting his colleague's analytical ap-
proach, Professor Davis reached a similar conclusion through his
approval of Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co.,"o in which the Su-
preme Court acknowledged judicial deference to the initial adminis-
trative findings unless the statutory purpose renders them unrea-
sonable." Davis approved limiting judicial review to the reasonable-
ness of the agency action in regard to the statutory scheme, stating:
"Law development would be helped if the courts would resort less
55. Professor Davis criticized Jaffe's approach. Id. § 30.02-.03, at 546-49. Jaffe previously
had rebutted the criticism which Davis made in his earlier text. JrAM, supra note 50, at 592.
56. "Although all words may be 'chameleons, which reflect the color of their environment,'
. . 'significant' has that quality more than most." Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 837
(2d Cir. 1972) (Hanly II) (Friendly, J., dissenting), quoting Commissioner v. National Car-
bide Corp., 167 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1948).
57. JASln, supra note 50, at 566.
58. Id. at 567 (emphasis supplied).
59. Id. at 570 (emphasis supplied).
60. 390 U.S. 1 (1968).
61. The Court stated:
Given the innate and and inevitable vagueness of the 'area' concept and the
complexity of the factors relevant to decision in this matter, we think it is more
efficient, and thus more in line with the overall purposes of the Act, for the
courts to take the TVA's 'area' determinations as their starting points and to
set these determinations aside only when they lack reasonable support in rela-
tion to the statutory purpose. ...
Id. at 9, quoted in DAviS, supra note 48, § 30.03, at 549.
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to the labels and would discuss more the reasons for their choices
concerning the scope of review. '8 2
The similarity of the definitional construction in Hardin and
NEPA supports applying to both a standard of judicial review based
on the reasonableness of the agency determination. Partial reconcil-
iation of the two authors' views requires two assumptions: that judi-
cial review of administrative decisions includes initial deference to
administrative expertise, and that courts may exercise discretionary
judgment based on a variety of factors." Starting from those shared
assumptions, Jaffe and Davis both recognized the efficacy of a test
that avoids the "labeling" of questions, but seeks rather to evaluate
an administrative decision by a standard of reasonableness.
Current Case Law Reflecting Disparate Standards for Review
Current standards for judicial review of a negative threshold de-
termination reflect a disparate array of terms confounding courts
and commentators alike." Recent decisions suggest at least five
different standards and additional combinations. A brief discussion
and analysis of each test points out the distinctions that are integral
to the quest for a rational, uniform standard of review.
62. DAVIS, supra note 48, § 30.03, at 549.
63. Professor Jaffe included several subjective considerations: the relevance of administra-
tive expertise to rulemaking, the clarity and stability of proposed rules, the importance of
the rule to the statutory and administrative scheme, psychological advantage of judicial
pronouncement, and ultimate judicial scrutiny to insure administrative integrity. JAZP,
supra note 50, at 576. Professor Davis also identified factors influencing judicial discretion,
including the comparative qualifications of courts and agencies, judicial impressions of
agency thoroughness, the extent of expressly delegated powers, and the perceived need for
judicial lawmaking. DAvis, supra note 48, § 30.06, at 552.
64. The district court specifically articulated no standard for procedural review in Goose
Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971). Commentators never-
theless have cited the case as asserting the arbitrary-or-capricious standard. See, e.g., Note,
NEPA, Environmental Impact Statements and the Hanly Litigation: To File or Not to File,
48 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 522, 534 & n.104 (1973). The district court in Citizens for Reid State Park
v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783 (D. Me. 1972), appears to have employed the standard of "warrant
in the record and a reasonable basis in law." Id. at 789. One commentator, however, cited
the decision as embracing the arbitrary-and-capricious test. 7 GA. L. REv. 785, 792 n.40
(1973).
Professor Sive writes of the "substantial evidence-rational basis test," apparently referring
to the reasonable basis test of Reid Park. Sive, supra note 45. He has evidently exchanged
the phrase "warrant in the record" for "substantial evidence," thereby restricting the test to
the more stringent limits of Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951) (substan-
tial evidence when viewed on the record as a whole). The substantial evidence rule presents
a virtually insurmofintable barrier to environmentalists challenging the vast resources of
administrative bodies. Large, Is Anybody Listening? The Problem of Access in Environmen-
tal Litigation, 1972 Wis. L. Rv. 62; Comment, Judicial Review of a VEPA Negative
Statement, 53 B.U.L. Ray. 879, 879 n.2 (1973).
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(1) Arbitrary, Capricious
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Hanly II gave
lengthy consideration to the proper standard for judicial review of
an agency's threshold determination under NEPA. 5 Noting the
Supreme Court's acceptance in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park
v. Volpe6 of section 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act67 as
controlling, the Hanly HT court reiterated the statutory declaration
that administrative decisions are subject to judicial review when
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in
accordance with law." '68 In addition to its precedential authority, the
panel embraced. the reasoning underlying that Supreme Court
enunciation as manifesting an appropriate balance between substi-
tution of judicial judgment and deference to administrative exper-
tise.69 Considerable commentary, however, has questioned whether
the arbitrary-and-capricious standard for judicial review is proper
in NEPA cases."
The different statutory bases for Overton Park and Hanly 1 dis-
tinguished the cases and raise the question of the applicability of
the arbitrary-and-capricious standard to section 102 disputes. In-
volving neither the preparation of an EIS nor any other NEPA pro-
vision, the Overton Park litigation arose from the refusal of the
65. 471 F.2d at 828-30. For a general discussion of the case, see notes 34-41 supra &
accompanying text.
66. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
67. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
68. 471 F.2d at 828-29.
69. 471 F.2d at 828. Dictum by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114-15 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
also may have swayed the Hanly H court. 471 F.2d at 829. Discussing NEPA, the Calvert
Cliffs' court stated that "reviewing courts probably cannot reverse a substantive decision on
its merits, under Section 101, unless it be shown that the actual balance of costs and benefits
that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values."
449 F.2d at 115. The court in Calvert Cliffs', however, was appraising substantive review
under section 101; the Hanly Hcourt faced procedural review under section 102. The inapplic-
ability of the Calvert Cliffs' dictum to the Hanly If controversy is evinced further in Judge
Wright's admonition that "procedural duties, the duties to give full consideration to environ-
mental protection, are subject to a much more strict standard of compliance. . . ." Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1128 (1971) (emphasis in original).
70. See, e.g., Comment, Judicial Review of a NEPA Negative Statement, 53 B.U.L. REV.
879 (1973). See also Note, NEPA; Environmental Impact Statements and the Hanly Litiga-
tion: To File or Not to File, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 522 (1973); 51 Tax. L. Rav. 1016 (1973). For
detailed analyses of the Overton Park standard, see The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 85 HARV.
L. RE:V. 37, 315 (1971); Note, Environmental Law and the Scope of Judicial Review, 24 STAN.
L. REV. 1117 (1972); Note, Administrative Law-Extending the Authority of the Judiciary to
Review Administrative Agency Decisions, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 613.
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Secretary of Transportation, in apparent disregard of two federal
acts, 71 to assess adequately the alternatives to a planned highway.
Distinguishing between the relatively specific directives of these two
acts and the broad language of NEPA, in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinat-
ing Committee v. AEC 2 Judge Wright stated: "[NEPA] makes
environmental protection a part of the mandate of every federal
agency and department. . . [Agencies arel not only permitted,
but compelled, to take environmental values into account ...
[Tihe requirement of environmental consideration 'to the fullest
extent possible' sets a high standard for the agencies, a standard
which must be vigorously enforced by the reviewing courts." 3 The
marked differences between the statutory bases of Overton Park and
Hanly if suggest that Overton Park does not control cases arising
under NEPA and that courts are at liberty to select a reviewing
standard calculated to ensure that the invocation of administrative
expertise does not defeat the essential purposes of the Act.
Although the strict Overton Park standard may be inapplicable
to section 102 determinations, the court of appeals in Hanly H may
have perceived a flexibility in that standard. Several commentators
have argued persuasively that Overton Park poses a bifurcated test
that, in practice, confines judicial review less than the arbitrary-
and-capricious standard. 4 The initial step is inquiring whether the
agency has considered all relevant factors. Courts would reach the
second phase, the application of the arbitrary-and-capricious stan-
dard, only upon a showing by the agency that its decision resulted
from the consideration of all relevant factors. Whether perceiving
71. Department of Transportation Act of 196 § 4(), 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970); Federal-
Aid Highway Act of 1968 § 18(a), 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970). See 401 U.S. at 404-05.
In rejecting the arbitrary-and-capricious standard for section 102 determinations, the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit expressed the distinction resulting from different statutory
authority: "In assessing the adequacy of the impact statement, we are not here reviewing, as
we said above [referring to Overton Park], agency action within the meaning of § 706 of the
APA. Rather, we are concerned with the NEPA requirement which is, to be sure, a prerequis-
ite for agency action but is not agency action itself." National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486
F.2d 995, 1001 (10th Cir. 1973).
72. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Virtually every court hearing environmental claims
arising under NEPA has cited that landmark decision with approval. See, e.g., Davis v.
Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972); Montgomery v. Ellis, 364 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Ala.
1973); Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 352 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo. 1972); Northside Tenants'
Rights Coalition v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
73. 449 F.2d at 1112, 1114.
74. See generally Note, NEPA; Environmental Impact Statements and the Hanly Litiga-
tion: To File or Not to File, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 522, 535-36 (1973); Note, Environmental Law
and the Scope of Judicial Review, 24 STAN. L. REv. 117 (1972). For a discussion of erviron-
mental cases raising additional "relevant factors," see Sive, supra note 45, at 632-39.
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the arbitrary-and-capricious standard as strict or flexible, an appar-
ent majority of courts initially employed this standard when com-
pelled to scrutinize administrative threshold decisions under
NEPA.7 5 The high standards articulated in Calvert Cliffs' for ad-
ministrative decisions and the judicial reluctance to accept the
more extensive procedural review implicit in the bifurcated Overton
Park test, however, challenge the suitability of the arbitrary-and-
capricious standard for reviewing procedural compliance.
(2) Substantial Evidence-Relevant Factor
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had set forth in
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC,78 an earlier stan-
dard for reviewing environmental disputes. The standard appears to
be a judicial hybrid, composed of the traditional substantial evi-
dence rule,77 and the first half of the bifurcated Overton Park test.78
Believing that it will open up the process of judicial review, at least
one commentator has endorsed the test,7 but the great majority of
environmental decisions have overlooked it. Perhaps the most griev-
ous shortcoming of the standard, from the environmentalist posi-
tion, is that it virtually precludes the possibility of a judgment for
a plaintiff on the merits, due to the potentially vast documentary
resources of an administrative agency."
75. See, eg., First Nat'l Bank v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369 (7th Cir. 1973) (relying una-
bashedly upon Hanly II); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 342 F. Supp.
1211 (E.D. Ark. 1972); Echo Park Residents Comm. v. Romney, 3 BNA ENv. REP. CAsEs 1255
(C.D. Cal. 1971).
76. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
77. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). See generally DAvis, supra note
48, § 29.02, at 527-30.
78. See note 64 supra & accompanying text.
79. Sive, supra note 45, at 638-39. See generally Note, Scenic Hudson.Revisited: The
Substantial Evidence Test and Judicial Review of Agency Environmental Findings, 2 EcoL.
L.Q. 837 (1972).
80. The Environmental Defense Fund challenge to the Gilham Dam Project proposed for
the Cossatot River in Arkansas graphically illustrates the problem. The Army Corps of Engi-
neers, the "action agency" involved, initially filed a 12-page EIS that was found to be little
more than a recast of information already held in defendant's files. Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971). Upon the granting of a
temporary injunction, the Corps returned with a voluminous report, exceeding two hundred
pages, with more than one thousand pages in the appendix, at a cost to taxpayers of more
than a quarter of a million dollars. Predictably, the Corps reached virtually identical conclu-
sions, but when faced with the sheer weight of evidentiary documents, the district court felt
compelled to concede that the EIS was sufficient to alert decisionmakers to the desirability
of preserving the Cossatot as a free-flowing river. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps




The Supreme Court formally articulated a third standard for re-
view of agency action known as the rational basis test81 or the "doc-
trine of Gray v. Powell,"82 in NLRB v. Hearst."' Construing the
meaning of "employee" under the National Labor Relations Act,8s
the Court rejected the position that newsboys were independent
contractors under principles of common law, and held that "the
Board's determination that specified persons are 'employees' under
this Act is to be accepted if it has 'warrant in the record' and a
reasonable basis in law."85 The Court further noted: "[W]here the
question is one of the specific application of a broad statutory term
in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must
determine it initially, the reviewing court's function is limited."88
The latter language could impose upon environmental plaintiffs a
difficult burden, particularly in challenges to administrative exper-
tise. It is evident, however, that courts routinely apply the reasona-
ble basis test to mixed questions of law and fact, enabling the appel-
late court to isolate questions of law and thus permitting greater
freedom to substitute judicial judgment for that of the agency than
does the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. Several courts and
commentators considering section 102 procedures have approved
the reasonable basis standard.88 By facilitating a more thorough
of EIS sufficiency, the court of appeals provided the Corps a pyrrhic victory. Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972). In what may represent a
landmark decision in substantive review, the court asserted that NEPA is more than just a
full disclosure law and noted that compliance with section 102 is based upon good faith
objectivity rather than subjective impartiality. Id. at 296.
81. DAviS, supra note 48, § 30.07, at 549-50; JAFE, supra note 50, at 575.
82. 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
83. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
84. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
85. 322 U.S. at 131.
86. Id.
87. Under the Hearst approach, a reviewing court may intervene whenever a clear rule of
law is involved, thereby exhibiting greater freedom of action than under the substantial
evidence test or arbitrary-and-capricious standard. Comment, Judicial Review of a NEPA
Negative Statement, 53 B.U.L. REv. 879,896 (1973). Professor Davis' comments are especially
pertinent on the degree to which courts indulge in the often critical task of characterizing
questions of law and fact: "In reviewing administrative action which is reviewable, a court
always has power to decide questions of law and the realism is that to a great extent a court
has power to convert questions of discretion and questions of fact into questions of law by
making law about them. Questions of fact are constantly turned into questions of law...
DAvis, supra note 48, § 30.07, at 554.
88. See, e.g., Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1095
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783,789 (S.D. Me. 1972);
Comment, Judicial Review of a NEPA Negative Statement, 53 B.U.L. Ray. 879, 896 (1973).
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basis for review of a threshold decision, that standard complements
the proposition that the extent of administrative procedural compli-
ance generally merits strict judicial scrutiny."
The inherent subtlety of the law-fact distinction renders the rea-
sonable basis test, as traditionally applied to mixed questions, diffi-
cult to use in reviewing threshold determinations. After judicial
determination that an issue embodies questions of law and fact, a
court's resolution of the relevant law need not be determinative,
because a court can permit an agency's factual finding to stand."
Further, although the test affords some freedom for appellate re-
view, the reasonable basis standard attaches as a condition subse-
quent to judicial identification of a mixed question, foreclosing an
opportunity for greater judicial latitude on a question of law alone.'
However wielded by appellate courts, application of that standard
necessarily entails embroilment in the law-fact controversy, and
thereby fails to resolve the confusion surrounding the assessment of
a threshold decision under section 102(2)(C).
(4) Review De Novo
The fact-law dilemma also underlies review de novo,92 a standard
89. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. ABC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1128 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Comment, Judicial Review of a NEPA Negative Statement, 53 B.U.L. Rav. 879 (1973).
90. The most recent chapter in the Hanly litigation underscores this contention. Pursuant
to two remands for insufficiency, the GSA returned to the court of appeals with a third
negative declaration and the court permitted the factual findings to stand. Hanly v. Klein-
dienst, 484 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973). The Hearst case, the formal proponent of the standard,
provides further support. Having ruled on the question of "employee" as a matter of law, the
Court effectively deferred to the initial administrative determination, by reversing the lower
court ruling. NLRB v. Hearst, 322 U.S. 111 (1944). But see Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB,
330 U.S. 485 (1947), in which the Court, construing the same statutory term, agreed with the
Board's determination, but did not mention the Hearst standard and appeared to rule as a
matter of law.
91. A comparison of the Supreme Court responses in Hearst and Packard aptly illustrates
the distinction between judicial latitude in reviewing mixed questions and questions of law.
See note 90 supra. Seeking to resolve that evident complexity, Professor Jaffe asserted that
the Court viewed Packard, unlike Hearst, as raising a significant legal issue. JAFE, supra note
50, at 561. Davis, on the other hand, appears content to avoid analyzing the reasons foi the
two approaches, having argued instead that the two cases, taken together, demonstrate that
in practice the Court frequently "substitutes judgment" on mixed questions. DAvis, supra
note 48, § 30.05, at 551.
92. The distinction between review de novo and trial de novo is helpful in understanding
the role of the reviewing court. Section 10(e) of the APA authorizes trial de novo. 5 U.S.C. §
706 (2)(F) (1970). The concept refers to those narrow areas of jurisdictional facts, determining
constitutional rights, to which courts must direct full judicial scrutiny and for which ar
administrative tribunal may not afford final adjudication.. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22
(1932). Although significantly eroded, the doctrine retains currency at least when applied to
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expressly provided in section 10(e) of the APA93 that acknowledges
the reviewing court's powers to "decide all relevant questions of
law." Accordingly, judicial review de novo would seem to apply in
environmental controversies, when the court can find a question of
law. Courts in three recent cases appear to have evaluated adminis-
trative findings afresh and reversed negative EIS determinations as
a matter of law. 4 Commentators have disputed the extent to which
these decisions demonstrate the viability of review de novo; all three
involved extreme factual situations and the administrative determi-
nation would have fallen under even the arbitrary-and-capricious
standard.'- Although providing uncertain authority, those cases
nonetheless suggest a judicial tendency to reject previously articu-
lated standards of environmental review in the search for a more
appropriate guide for resolving disputes arising under the broad
mandate of NEPA.
Under close scrutiny, however, the review de novo standard stum-
bles into three pitfalls when applied in environmental cases. First,
courts must isolate a question of law, a task that may prove exceed-
a deprivation of liberty or a "loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth
living." DAvis, supra note 48, § 29.08, at 539. Subsequent decisions have carved so many
exceptions from the Benson doctrine that the case no longer may be good law. However, Ng
Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922), holding that the Government could not deport
residents claiming American citizenship without a judicial determination of citizenship, still
stands as a bulwark of the trial de novo doctrine.
Despite the apparent relationship between the criteria noted by Davis and the cry for a
healthful environment, the essential requirement of an infringement of a constitutionally
protected right probably will preclude trial de novo from assisting environmentalists. See
notes 12-15 supra & accompanying text. A few courts, however, have analogized the threshold
determination to a jurisdictional fact and thereby have justified liberalizing the scope of
procedural review. See, e.g., Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973),
discussed, notes 97-101 infra & accompanying text.
93. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
94. Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 882 (W.D. Wis. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 466 F.2d
1027 (7th Cir. 1972) (court required to construe the statutory standards, then apply them to
the particular project); National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356
(E.D.N.C. 1972) (same reasoning as in Scherr); Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP) v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 93 S. Ct. 2405 (1973) (unstated standard that suggested review de novo).
95. One commentator analyzed Scherr as asserting review de nova. Comment, Judicial
Review of a NEPA Negatiue Statement, 53 B.U.L. REv. 879 (1973). The better view, however,
is that the extreme factual situation removed the necessity for such an extensive review. The
affirmance on other grounds by the court of appeals suggests that the district court's language
about a more searching standard was dictum. A second commentator questioned the prece-
dential value of either Scherr or Grant for review de nova. 7 Ga. L. Rev. 785, 792 n.40 (1973).
Similarly, although the unstated ground in SCRAP inferentially was review de novo, the court
suggested that it might have ruled differently if the record had revealed a detailed study by
the agency. 346 F. Supp. at 201 n.17.
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ingly difficult given the statutory breadth of "significantly" and the
essential interplay of administrative expertise with judicial review.
Utilization of that standard also would foist an intolerable burden
on a judicial system already laden with rapidly proliferating envi-
ronmental lawsuits. Finally, review de novo would appear to con-
travene the entire administrative decisionmaking scheme and effec-
tively vitiate the need for an administrative threshold decision.
(5) Reasonableness
In the judicial consideration of various standards for reviewing
NEPA threshold decisions, the standard of "reasonableness" almost
inevitably garners attention. Although an argument for appellate
review based on the formless criterion of reasonableness to aid an
examination of the vacuous term "significantly" creates no small
irony, judicial willingness to use a standard of reasonableness is not
altogether surprising in the context of inexplicit statutory guidelines
for review, potentially contradictory standards promulgated by the
APA, 5 and uncertainty among courts and commentators.
In Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger,97 the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, rejecting a General Services Administration (GSA)
determination that the construction of a federal office building
would have no significant environmental effect, concluded: "To best
effectuate the Act this decision should have been court-measured
under a more relaxed rule of reasonableness, rather than by the
narrower standard of arbitrariness or capriciousness.", 8 Evaluating
the sufficiency of the agency's threshold decision, the court analog-
ized that administrative action to determination of a jurisdictional
fact,9 a situation justifying trial de novo.10° The court further linked
the GSA's preliminary decision to the statutory scheme of NEPA
and therefore deemed the decision to merit critical review pursuant
to the manifest purposes of the Act.'"' Through its well-reasoned call
for a "more searching standard" of review, Kreger implicitly ex-
96. See Large, supra note 64, at 104.
97. 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973).
98. Id. at 465.
99. The court noted: "However, this usual fact determination review rule [substantial
evidence rule] ought not to be applied to test the basic jurisdiction-type conclusion involved
here." Id. at 466 (emphasis supplied).
100. See note 92 supra.
101. The court declared: "The spirit of the Act would die aborning if a facile, ex parte
decision that the project was minor or did not significantly affect the environment were too
well shielded from impartial review." 472 F.2d at 466.
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panded the scope of review permitted under Hanly ff and Overton
Park and arguably provided a landmark decision.
The Kreger standard of reasonableness soon received acclaim in
Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz,0 2 where the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected the district court's reliance
upon the arbitrary-and-capricious test in deciding whether two tim-
ber sales in Teton National Forest required an EIS.'0 3 Observing
that NEPA virtually compels procedural compliance,"'4 the court
was:
* . . persuaded that the general reference to discretion in § 706
(2) (A) of the Administrative Procedure Act, although applicable
to some other reviewable administrative decisions,. . . does not
apply here to the agency's determination under NEPA. Under
the specific terms of NEPA we feel that the proper standard
S.. is whether the negative determination was reasonable in
the light of the mandatory requirements and high standards set
by the statute so as to be "in accordance with law"-another
ground of review. .. which may be applied consistently with
the procedural demands of NEPA. 11
Building upon Kreger and other recent cases,"' the Wyoming
102. 484 F.2d 1244 (l0th Cir. 1973).
103. Under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard, the district court found that an EIS was
not required. Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 359 F. Supp. 1178 (D. Wyo.
1973). The two sales involved 7,330 and 8,410 million board feet of timber from forty-six
"clearcuts," a method whereby all standing timber is removed in a specified area. Arguably
the district court ruling would have merited reversal even had the appellate court chosen to
accept the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. The district court apparently reasoned that
drafting an EIS would quash the proposed sales, with foreseen disastrous results to the
Wyoming residents dependent upon the wood and pulp industries. Manifestly, that interpre-
tation was unduly restrictive and contrary to the statutory purpose, even assuming that
NEPA is only a full disclosure law. Furthermore, agencies should not be allowed to defend a
negative declaration on the ground that mere publication would lead to the abandonment of
a proposed project.
104. "NEPA's specific requirements in § 102 clearly speak in mandatory terms, and do not
leave the determination to administrative discretion." 484 F.2d at 1249, citing, inter alia,
National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 656 (10th Cir. 1971); Calvert Cliffs' Coordi-
nating Comm., Inc. v. ABC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Citizens for Reid State Park v.
Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783, 788 (D. Me. 1972).
105. 484 F.2d at 1249 (emphasis supplied).
106. E.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (rule of reason implicit in NEPA, but that statement was intended to apply to substan-
tive review); Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir. 1973)
(reasonable standard for threshold review). Wyoming Council also cited Save Our Ten Acres
v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973); Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 882 (W.D. Wis. 1971),
af'd on othergrounds, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
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Council opinion is especially noteworthy for its demonstrated con-
cern for the "high standards" set by NEPA and its distinction be-
tween the searching review of threshold determinations and the less
rigorous scrutiny of substantive issues after an agency files an EIS. 7
Wyoming Council arguably goes beyond even the Kreger rationale
for asserting broad powers of judicial review of threshold decisions
in its declaration that NEPA contains mandatory procedural re-
quirements. Against the background of the Hanly litigation and the
apparent expansion of Overton Park, the approach of the Courts of
Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits suggests a trend toward
broadening the standard for procedural review under NEPA.
THE CASE FOR MORE INCLUSIVE PROCEDURAL REVIEW
Since judicial notions of the proper limits for judicial scrutiny
currently range from virtual deference to administrative expertise 8
to review de novo, °5 the critical task becomes the fashioning of a
reviewing standard that best complements the broad purposes and
aspiring rhetoric of NEPA. As the "broadest and perhaps most im-
portant of the recent [environmental] statutes," 10 NEPA suggests
several compelling arguments for close examination of procedural
compliance under section 102(C). The interrelationship of the stat-
ute with certain considerations regarding environmental law pro-
vides the basis for fashioning a broad, searching standard for proce-
107. Wyoming Council apparently suggests a judicial preference for requiring an EIS when
an agency's decision not to draft one is challenged. Requiring the agency to file an EIS forces
the agency to analyze and decide numerous specific issues. Once such issues are considered
in detail by the agency, review by a court is facilitated because it can determine easily the
specific factors which led to the agency's conclusion. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit demonstrated a similar preference for requiring the drafting of an EIS in Scherr v.
Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972). That preference first appeared in Calvert Cliffs' Coordi-
nating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Wyoming Council, however, relied on cases that turned upon the construction of phrases
other than "significantly." See, e.g., Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972), in which
the agency conceded that the action was significant, but argued that a lease of Indian lands
was not a major action. The court of appeals reversed the district court's affirmance of a
negative determination. Davis also was noteworthy for its apparent preference for an EIS and
its collection of a broad spectrum of prior case law. The same court of appeals subsequently
evinced a strong preference for an EIS: "[I1f the impact statement is to be meaningful the
requirement must be virtually absolute." National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995,
1000 (10th Cir. 1973). That endorsement, however, provides environmentalists little assis-
tance, as the case technically did not focus upon the NEPA procedural requirements, and
the statement was dictum.
108. See, e.g., Morningside Renewal Council, Inc. v. AEC, 482 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1973).
109. See cases cited note 94 supra.
110. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
1974] THRESHOLD DETERMINATIONS
dural review. Those elements include the alleged expertise of ad-
ministrative agencies, the breadth of the NEPA procedural man-
date, the minimal NEPA purpose of full disclosure, and the irrevoc-
ability of administrative actions affecting the environment.
In the first instance, the traditional doctrine of deference to ad-
ministrative expertise"1 may be particularly inappropriate in envi-
ronmental disputes, since many questions involve judgments that
intrinsically do not afford a ready basis for technological or scientific
measurement.11 2 Thus, even though an adverse cost-benefit analysis
in an EIS may terminate a proposed project,1 13 the judiciary and the
111. See, e.g., Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 414 (1958): "If the Commission
has decided the question, its discretionary determination should not be overturned in the
absence of a patent abuse of discretion."
112. Mr. Justice Douglas most eloquently stated the essence of that proposition in his
dissenting opinion in Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 94 S. Ct. 558, 559 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting), where he argued against the Court's dissolution of an injunction temporarily
halting construction of an airport reef runway in Honolulu:
NEPA embodies the belated national recognition that we have been "brought
to the brink" by myopic pursuit of technological progress and by a decision-
making mechanism resting largely on the advice of vested interest groups. A
long standing policy of listening only to those with enough money to be heard
has left our country scarred with a continuum of environmental abscesses ....
... NEPA was designed to correct in part the information void underlying
our national decision-making mechanism. Congress knew what happens when
we heed the counsel only of those who measure national advancement by GNP
and the Dow Jones Industrial average. Congress knew that we can trust them
to supply us with voluminous economic data, but it also knew that we cannot
trust them to supply us with an improved quality of life. They are not advocates
of the interests of mountains, forests, streams, rivers, oceans, and coral beds, or
of the wildlife that inhabit them or the people who enjoy them.
94 S. Ct. at 559-61.
113. Unfortunately, the opposite philosophy appears to be the generally accepted view at
present. See, e.g., Ecos, Inc. v. Volpe 5 BNA ENv. REP. Cpsas 2024, (4th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam) (no abuse of discretion found in federal district court's refusal to issue preliminary
injunction when the agency prepared no final EIS and an evident finding was that costs
clearly outweighed the benefits of continuing construction on a federal-aid highway). An-
other case, however, may somewhat erode that position. Drawing upon the reasoning in
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), see
note 80 supra, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit apparently reversed its philosophy
in Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973). The district court first had
denied a preliminary injunction in a challenge to a proposed dam. Conservation Council v.
Froehlke, 340 F. Supp. 222 (M.D.N.C. 1972). In its summary affirmance, the court of appeals
held that NEPA provided procedural remedies rather than substantive rights and that the
Government could build the dam despite an adverse cost-benefit analysis in the EIS. Conser-
vation Council v. Froehlke, 4 BNA ENv. REP. CASES 1044 (4th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). Subse-
quent to the denial of the injunction, the court of appeals reversed and held:" 'District Courts
have an obligation to review substantive agency decisions on the merits to determine if they
are in accord with NEPA' [and the] .... District Court must engage in a 'substantial
inquiry' to determine 'whether there has been a clear error of judgment.'" Conservation
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bureaucracy should not use only compilations of data when making
decisions that affect the complex interrelationship of environmental
factors and the intertwined subjectivity of human feelings.' More-
over, NEPA imparts upon all agencies an affirmative duty to inte-
grate environmental considerations into the decisionmaking process
through a systematic, interdisciplinary approach."5 The broad com-
mand of the Act extends an agency's consideration of environmenital
factors beyond a narrow cost-benefit analysis. Such a requirement
of utilization of an interdisciplinary approach also lends support to
a searching standard of judicial review, because courts are at least
equally capable of assessing factors outside an agency's expertise.
Commentators have contended more vigorously than courts that
the concept of administrative expertise does not apply to environ-
mental concerns. ' Even those administrative law scholars who
emphasize initial deference to such expertise recognize the limits of
the concept. Professor Jaffe, for example, acknowledges that "in its
field of expertness the agency's decisions are final if 'reasonable';
and conversely that there is a field of general law in which the courts
are, as it were, experts."'1 7 Including numerous factors that do not
Council v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664, 665 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (citations omitted). In
directing the district court to issue a preliminary injunction pendente lite, the court appar-
ently responded affirmatively to scholarly criticism of the earlier district court case and to
the broader topic of substantive review under NEPA. For a critical analysis of the early
Froehlke case, see 51 N.C.L. Rnv. 145 (1972). See generally Judicial Review: NEPA and the
Courts, 1973 DuKE L.J. 301; Note,.Substantive Review Under the National Environmental
Policy Act: EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 3 ECOL. L.Q. 173 (1973) (suggesting three critical areas
that courts may examine in evaluating administrative decisions on the merits).
114. The monitoring and compilation of technological data is indeed a proper pursuit in
the broad field of environmental law. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970), for example,
mandates complex monitoring and recording devices to meet attainment schedules for emis-
sion limitations. The numerous studies of improper resource allocation and residue statistics
demonstrating the grievous need for improved recycling techniques are further examples of
the need for empirical evidence on the misuse of the environment. See, e.g., United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 700-01 nn.1 &
2 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The core of the problem, however, is that frequently basic
factors which determine whether to construct a proposed project are incapable of quantifica-
tion in terms of aesthetic, cultural, social, or perhaps even psychological values.
115. NEPA § 102(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) (1970).
116. Professor Sive has asserted: "[ihe bulk of the important questions in environmental
cases call more for the talents and training of the courts and judges than for those of the
administrative agencies and administrators. The basic reason is the very breadth of the
questions, the requirement of balancing opposing economic and social interests. Such balanc-
ing and weighing require more art than science." Sive, supra note 45, at 629.
117. JAFFE, supra note 50, at 579.
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lend themselves to ready quantification, environmental controver-
sies arguably fall into the area of "general law," for which courts are
more appropriate arbiters than are agencies. Professor Jaffe further
observed: "Expertness is in any case a matter of emphasis or degree
. . . In judicial review, the court must evaluate the relevance and
weight of expertness. . . . Courts also should remain wary of expert
opinion which really only seeks to advance the expert's conception
of policy, cloaking it in the concept of expertise."118
Under that analysis, a court should evaluate the particular
agency determining not to file an EIS."9 Although that approach
may be more relevant to substantive review after the filing of an
EIS, possible grounds for reversing a negative threshold decision
could include lack of good faith' or lack of expertise on a matter of
crucial environmental and aesthetic value.' 2' Moreover, when an
118. Id. (emphasis in original).
119. Administrative law scholars routinely acknowledge the relative degrees ofcompetency
of various agencies and argue that courts should consider that factor as one of several subjec-
tive elements in their evaluations. See notes 63, 64 supra. Moreover, agencies have varied
greatly in their compliance with NEPA. The response by the Atomic Energy Commission,
culminating in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1971), and Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir.
1973), demonstrates a notorious instance of foot dragging. When one study ended on May 24,
1971, the Atomic Energy Commission had yet to deny a single construction or licensing permit
after a hearing. Large, supra note 64, at 92 n.135. The Soil Conservation Service, on the other
hand, appears to have implemented its regulations with a minimum of reticence. See, e.g.,
Simmans v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Tax. 1974).
120. Arguments calling for substantive review of an EIS have raised the question of good
faith. See, e.g., Greene City Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding an
EIS inadequate because defendant had abdicated a significant part of its responsibility under
NEPA by substituting the statement of the Power Authority of the State of New York
(PASNY) for its own). According to Greene, the rationale in such case is that "[t]he dan-
ger ... is the potential, if not likelihood, that the applicant's statement will be based upon
self-serving assumptions." Id. at 420. But see Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460 (9th
Cir. 1973) (compliance with NEPA as to the preparation of an EIS based upon good ffith
objectivity rather than subjective impartiality; hence, an EIS prepared in significant part by
a consulting firm having a large financial interest in construction of the proposed airport reef
runway held not violative of the letter or spirit of NEPA). For a decision that apparently
raises a question of good faith compliance with procedural requirements, see Morningside
Renewal Council, Inc. v. AEC, 482 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1973). The court denied review of an
agency decision to license a Triga Mark II nuclear reactor at Columbia University in New
York City since the license issuance did not constitute major federal action "significantly
affecting the environment." The court used the arbitrary-and-capricious standard to review
the threshold determinations, but a strong dissent by Judge Oakes raised serious claims of
bad faith by the agency. Id. at 241.
121. For example, agencies charged with promotional and developmental responsibilities
might lack the practical ability to evaluate the impact of the Storm King hydroelectric
project on the natural beauty of Storm King Mountain, Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf.
v. FFC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972), or the impact of the
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agency is evidently reticent in its response to NEPA's procedural
requirements, a searching standard of review also would include an
investigation of the agency's attitude and expertise.'
Beyond the question of adminstrative expertise in environmental
controversies, the case for broad, more extensive procedural review
also rests upon the breadth of the statutory mandate. Cases arising
under NEPA's encompassing procedural requirements are clearly
distinguishable from cases based upon other statutes, such as those
in Overton Park where the Supreme Court applied the arbitrary-
and-capricious standard.r Hence, because of the differing statu-
tory provisions, Overton Park appears to be of dubious preceden-
tial value in reviewing the procedural requirements of section 102.
Careful analysis of the Overton Park standard reveals the necessity
of an initial searching inquiry into the scope of an agency's author-
ity, an examination that appears analogous to that conducted under
Hardin121 to discern the statutory purpose. The breadth of the proce-
dural mandate in section 102 also appears similar to what Professor
Davis calls "determinations of fact [that] are fundamental or 'ju-
risdictional,' in the sense that their existence is a condition preced-
ent to the operation of the statutory scheme."' 2s Although the diffi-
culties in applying the doctrine of trial de novo to environmental
litigation are manifest, 121 the rationale underlying the right to trial
de novo analogously supports an inclusive procedural review under
NEPA to avoid the possibility that a negative EIS determination
could subvert the Act's action-forcing scheme.
A negative EIS determination also can thwart a minimal, judi-
cially recognized purpose of NEPA, that is, its value as a "full
disclosure law."' 27 Since the most widely accepted purpose of an EIS
Gilham Dam project on one of the last free-flowing wild rivers in the Southwest, Environmen-
tal Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
122. Senator Jackson, Senate sponsor of NEPA, has stated: "We expected Section 102 of
the act. . . to force the agencies to move. . . We did not anticipate that it would be private
parties through the courts that would force the compliance. This is what has made it work."
Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 28, 1973, at 12, in United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedure (SCRAP), 93 S. Ct. 2405, 2426 n.5 (1973) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting).
123. See notes 65-71 supra & accompanying text.
124. See notes 60-61 supra & accompanying text.
125. DAvis, supra note 48, § 29.08, at 539, quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1922)
(emphasis supplied).
126. See notes 12-15 supra & accompanying text.
127. The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), and that of the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit in Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973),
[Vol. 16:107
1974] THRESHOLD DETERMINATIONS
is to inform Congress, the public, and the agencies themselves'2
about foreseeable environmental consequences of proposed adminis-
trative actions, the achievement of reasoned decisionmaking war-
rants strict scrutiny of a threshold decision. The observation that
courts traditionally examine questions of procedure more carefully
than those of substance' further buttresses that conclusion. The
legislative history of the Act also may support a broad scope of
judicial review, by requiring compliance "to the fullest extent possi-
ble"'"" with the substantive goals of section 101 taken together with
the procedural imperatives of section 102.'1'
A final argument in favor of more searching procedural review
concerns the problem, implicit in all environmental litigation, that
any administrative action is irrevocable from an environmental
standpoint. To prevent activity having irrevocable consequences, an
environmental plaintiff, whether an individual or an organization,
first must seek to enjoin action on a project before attempting to
assail the myriad of other procedural defenses erected by the invari-
ably self-interested agency.132 Since Congress evidently did not in-
tend the agencies to disregard totally their functional mandate
when preparing an EIS, 1 3 agencies created to construct certain pro-
suggest a discernible trend toward expanding the full disclosure concept. See notes 80, 113
supra.
128. Congressman Dingell, the House sponsor of NEPA asserted:
The success of the environmental impact statements is not so much that they
were used as we intended they should, but that citizens have been able to use
the process as a [way] to get into court. . .. The impact statement itself is
not important. The important thing is that proper judgments are made reflect-
ing environmental considerations -in the decision-making process. The impact
statement should be... a process by which the public can be informed and
brought into the decision-making process.
Cahn, Can Federal Law Help Citizens Save Nature's Fragile Beauty?, Christian Science
Monitor, Feb. 28, 1973, at 12, in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedure (SCRAP), 93 S. Ct. 2405, 2429 n.10 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
129. See, e.g., Philco Corp. v. FCC, 293 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Philco Corp. v. FCC,
257 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 946 (1959).
130. NEPA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
131. For a cogent argument for substantive review based upon NEPA's legislative history,
see Sive, supra note 45, at 645-48. Another commentator reaches the same conclusion by
applying the principles of statutory construction to both sections 101 and 102. Comment,
Judicial Review of Factual Issue Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 51 ORE. L.
Rsv. 408, 413-16 (1972).
132. Large, supra note 64, at 89.
133. Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir.), injunction vacated, 94 S. Ct.
558 (1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 296 (8th Cir.
1972), aft'g 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark. 1972); Sierra Club v. Froelike, 359 F. Supp. 1289,
1342 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
jects gradually lose the ability to place their responsibilities in a
larger perspective and refrain from construction.' Consequently, a
challenge to the inherent administrative self-interest that can gen-
erate irreparable environmental damage requires, at a minimum,
the opportunity to be heard, the reasonable exploration of all avail-
able alternatives, and the publication of a cost-benefit analysis.
Because of the environmentally irrevocable nature of a claim arising
under NEPA, courts should apply a broad, searching standard of
procedural review to realize the goals enunciated in the Act.13
THE THRESHOLD DECISION: THE PROPER STANDARD FOR REVIEW
From the muddled current status of procedural review under
NEPA, a trend apparently is emerging toward abandonment of the
arbitrary-and-capricious standard which courts initially applied.
Although similarities among the various tests being used might in-
dicate that any conflict between tests is purely semantic, the pres-
ent applications of the standards reflect varying degrees of judicial
scrutiny. Decided advantages appear to exist in the employment of
a standard of "reasonableness," which, if uniformly applied, would
best complement the roles of both courts and administrative agen-
cies alike.
Reasonableness, underlying each reviewing standard to some de-
gree, appears to be the lowest common denominator of all the pres-
ent tests. By considering the scope of administrative authority in
general, and in particular, whether the agency's decision discusses
all relevant factors, the bifurcated Overton Park test, if applied
strictly, addresses the reasonableness of the agency's decision.'36
Reflecting in part the Overton Park standard, the substantial
evidience-relevant factor test of Scenic Hudson similarly addresses
administrative reasonableness. Judicial review under the reasona-
ble basis standard also addresses the reasonableness of the exercise
of administrative discretion.'37 Likewise review de novo reflects the
134. The alternative not to construct a proposed project first arose in a context other than
NEPA, but its appropriateness to considerations reached in an EIS appears manifest. See
Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967). See generally Sive, supra note 45, at 634-37.
135. NEPA § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. 4331(b) (1970).
136. Until Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), however, courts seemed reluctant to recognize the bi-level approach of Overton
Park; they appeared to apply merely the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of the APA with-
out pursuing an initial searching inquiry into all relevant factors, including the scope of
administrative authority.
137. The reasonable basis test necessarily involves the law-fact dilemma and applies only
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reasonableness standard to the extent that both seek to measure the
totality of the administrative determination in relation to the
court's construction of the NEPA mandate.
Moreover, the proper realization of the statutory mandate and
purpose of NEPA requires that "reasonableness" become the deci-
sive criterion in judicial review of administrative threshold determi-
nations, rather than a mere subordinate and often ignored"1 8 factor.
Uniform judicial employment of the reasonableness standard would
avoid the law-fact dilemma and provide the basis for broad judicial
review which the unique factors in environmental disputes dictate.
Administrative law scholars have indicated support for a standard
of reasonableness; Professor Davis specifically prefers the standard
of reasonableness in Hardin to the fact-law imbroglia. 39 Professor
Jaffe, although subscribing to a different rationale to explain judi-
cial selection of a particular standard, apparently endorses the rea-
sonableness measure as well."'
Judicial review premised upon the reasonableness of administra-
tive decisions should prove advantageous to court and administra-
tive agencies alike. The reasonableness reviewing standard would
encourage administrators to fashion rules," ' pursuant to the CEQ
guidelines, to identify those actions likely to require environmental
impact statements. Judicial evaluation of threshold decisions then
could assess the reasonableness of the rules themselves and the
relationship of an agency's factual findings to its own guidelines,
rather than use the ad hoc approach which courts presently employ
to evaluate the determinations of each agency. Such a method of
judicial review would preserve the domain of administrative discre-
tion without rendering it impenetrable to judicial review. A reasona-
bleness standard, therefore, would enable a reviewing court to set
aside an unreasonable administrative determination and substitute
its judgment without becoming embroiled in the law-fact contro-
versy.
where courts clearly find a mixed question. See notes 81-91 supra & accompanying text.
"Reasonableness," on the other hand, affords a reviewing court greater flexibility because it
need not become embroiled in the law-fact controversy. The court instead simply may evalu-
ate the reasonableness of the administrative determination taken as a whole, as in Kreger
and Wyoming Council.
138. See note 136 supra.
139. See notes 60-62 supra & accompanying text.
140. See notes 57-59 supra & accompanying text.
141. Both Jaffe and Davis apparently sanction a concept of judicial review that provides
an impetus for administrative rulemaking. DAvis, supra note 48, § 6.03, at 142-43, § 6.05, at
147-48, § 29.01, at 525-27; JAsm, supra note 50, at 563-64, 569-73. See also Comment, Judicial
Review of a NEPA Negative Statement, 53 B.U.L. Rav. 879, 893-95 (1973).
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CONCLUSION
Considering the conspicuous absence of informative legislative
history and the respective administrative and judicial tasks, courts
should not attempt to define the precise bounds of the term "signifi-
cantly," but logically should grant initial deference to an adminis-
trative determination that is itself subject to the agency's own pre-
scribed criteria. When called upon to review an administrative
threshold determination under section 102, courts should apply an
inclusive standard of reasonableness both to realize the broad
NEPA mandate and in recognition of particular considerations in-
herent in environmental law disputes. Some courts admittedly are
moving toward the standard of reasonableness, but the judicial
trend away from the initially articulated arbitrary-and-capricious
standard remains incomplete. Uniform application of the reason-
ableness review standard would preserve judicial consistency in
environmental decisionmaking and help dispel the evident confu-
sion about the intended effect of the statute as it relates to Con-
gress, the agencies, and the public.
Based upon the reasonableness standard, searching judicial re-
view of an agency's decision whether to file an EIS can avert the
emasculation of NEPA. The end result, nevertheless, may be merely
to breed "a race of impact statement writers"'' 2 who quickly em-
brace the form of an EIS, effectively subvert the goal of reasoned
consideration through massive compilation of documents, and
thereby present environmentalists a paperwork argument difficult
to refute substantively. Consequently, even the achievement of in-
clusive judicial review of an administrative threshold determina-
tion, like the environmentalist successes in the earlier controversies
of standing and jurisdiction, may be only another incremental suc-
cess in the campaign for a healthful environment.
142. The words are those of Representative Dingell, House sponsor of the Act. Calm, Can
Federal Law Help Citizens Save Nature's Fragile Beauty?, Christian Science Monitor, Feb.
28, 1973, at 12, in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 93 S. Ct. 2405, 2429 n.10 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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